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Case No. 7255

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LAGOON COMPANY, a corporation,
SALTAIR BEACH COMPANY, a
corporation, COVEY GAS & OIL
COMPANY, a partnership, INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, INC., a
eorporation, and UPTOWN 'THEATRE CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
UTAH STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION,
a public corporation, and AARON W.
TRACY, RULON S. HOWELLS, ARTHUR L. CRAWFORD, comprising
the Utah State Board of the Department of Publicity and Industrial Development, and BEEHIVE MIDWAYS, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and .Appellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LAGOOX CO:JIP ANY, a corporation,
SALT AIR BEACH COMPANY, a
corporation, CO\~EY GAS & OIL
CO~IP ANY, a partnership, INTER:JIOU:XTAIN THEATRES, INC., a
corporation, and UPTOWN THEATRE CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiffs and Respondent,s,

vs.

Case No. 7255

UTAH STATE FAIR ASSOCIATION,
a public corporation, and AARON W.
TRACY, RULON S. HOWELLS, ARTHUR L. CRAWFORD, comprising
the Utah State Board of the Department of Publicity and Industrial Development, and BEEHIVE MIDWAYS, INC., a corporation,
Defenaants and Appellants.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Respondents are in accord with the statements of
fact as set forth in the appellants' brief. In fact, there
was no dispute at the trial of the action as to any issues of fact, but only as to the materiality as to some
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presented by the appellants. It was the position of the
respondents at the trial that the only question was one
of law-did the Utah State Fair A.ss,ociation have the
authority to enter int~o the lease agreements (Exhibits
B arnd C) with Beehive Midways, Inc? Respondents
are of the opinion that this is the only question to be
determined by this Honorable Court, and anything which
was done by any parties subsequent to the execution
of the agreement is immaterial. If the agreements were
beyond the authority of the Utah State Fair Association, then they were void and no acts of the parties could
validate them.

•,'
I
\

,.,
I •''

Appellants have set forth eight Assignments of
Error in their brief, but have not argued them separately. Instead they have divided their argument into
six topics. In the interest of convenience and clarity,
respondents will endeavor to discuss and answer each
of these topics in the order in which they appear in the
brief of appellants.
ARGUMENT
I.

~·

EX'TENT OF POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES
AND STATE AGENCIES.

At the outset, respondents wish to state that they
are in accord with the rule of law set forth by the appellants, namely, that a municipality or state agency is
limited to those powers expressly granted, to those necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted, and to those essential to the declared
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
objects and purposes of the .~orporation, and that this
rule is relaxed when a municipality . or governmental
agency is not acting in a governmental capacity; however, respondents feel that this foregoing rule of law
finds no application in the instant case for the reasons
stated hereinafter.
Appellants place great .stress upon Utah Code Annotated 1943, 85-4-1, and quote portions of this statute
upon page twenty-six of their brief. For the court's convenience, we would like to set forth the entire statute,
underlining the portions deleted in appellants' brief,
which we consider to be of importance :
"The Utah state fair association is continued a body corporate with perpetual succession subject to the direction, supervision and con-·
trol of the commissioners of the department of
publicity and industrial development. It may
have and use a corporate seal, and by the aforesaid name may sue and be sued, contract and be
contracted with, and take amd hold by purchase,
gift, devise or bequest, real and ·personal property
required fo.r ~ts uses. It may also, with the approval of the department of finance, conv.ert such
property, when not suitable for its uses, into other
property which may be suitable for its uses, into
other property, or into money provided, however,
that money r·eceived from such conversion shall
be paid into the state treasury and placed to the
credit of the state fair association maintenance
fund. The Utah state fair association shall be
deemed a public corporation, and its property
shall be ·exempt from all taxes and assessments.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The foregoing statute in granting to the fair association the power to ''convert such property,'' has reference to that property which it might ''take and hold
by purchase, gift, devise or bequest, real and personal
property required for its uses.'' It does not grant to
the fair association the power to convert property ac.
quired under the original grant to the association. Property here involved is a portion of the original grant
by the State of Utah to the Utah State Fair Association.

I;
I

Commencing upon page twenty-seven of Appellants'
brief, it is argued that the agreement with Beehive Midways, Inc. does nothing more than convert a portion
of the fair grounds to another and more beneficial use,
and that the agreement is in effect a mere exchange of
different parcels of land. This argument absolutely ignores the terms of the agreement itself. We quote the
first sentence of paragraph one of the agreement (Exhibit B):
'' 1. That the Company (Beehive Midways,
Inc.) shall have the exclusive right to O·perate and
licensp others to operate all .a'YYIJUSement rides,
g~ames ~arnd

shows upon the Utah state fair
grounds during the years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950

and 1951." (Italics ours)
From the very terms of the agreement itself, Beehive Midways, Inc. is granted the exclusive right to
operate all amusement rides, games and shows upon any
and all portions of the state fair grounds. Thus, it is
seen that the agreement is not a lease for a particular
portion of the state fair grounds, but is in the nature
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
of a franchise or license whereunder Beehive l\fidways,
Inc. is given a monopoly to operate all forms of amusements and shows that are conducted upon the fair
grounds.
The lease agreement will further disclose the fact
that the Fair Board has actually gone into the amusement business. The lease provides for the Fair Board
to receive a percentage of the admission price of all admissions, and one-half of all money paid upon concession space. It further provides that all contracts that
may be entered into by the company (Beehive Midways,
Inc.) and licensee-concessionaires shall provide that admission fees or charges collected by the concessionaires
shall be subject to the approval of the Fair Board and
the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.). The lease agreement further gives the Fair Board the right at its· discretion to employ all cashiers for the sale of admission
to rides and shows or any percentage concession operated either by the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.)
or its licensees. The lease agreement further provides
that the Fair Board shall maintain all rest rooms within
the midway (that is, where the bulk of the shows were
being held), and shall provide at its own expense (Beehive Midways, Inc.) public liability insurance for the
protection of not only the Company (Beehive Midways,
Inc.), but the Fair Board against liability arising out
of the operation of the midway. It further provides that
the Company (Beehive Midways, Inc.) shall be subject
to all the rules and regulations published by the Fair
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Board for the operation of the Utah State Fair Associa:tion.

1.,

In determining the extent of the fair association's
power in leasing the property entrusted to it, reference
must be made to 85-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943,
which, in the opinion of respondents, is controlling in
the instant case. This statute reads as follows:
''The purpose of the association shall be to
promote in the state of Utah stock breeding, agriculture, horticulture, mining, manufacturing, and
the domestic scienoes and arts; and the associa- tion shall have the authority to use and to lease
the property of the association, during any portion of the interval between the holding of the
annual or biennial exhibitions, for private stock
exhibitions, shows, racing meets, and for other
legitimate purposes, upon terms and conditions
to be prescribed by the board of directors. All
moneys received from such leases shall be covered
into the state treasury at the end of each month
and placed to the credit of the state fair maintenance fund.''

I

Under the terms of this statute the fair association
is granted authority to lease property "during any portion of the interval between the holding of the annual
or biennial exhibition for private stock exhibitions,
shows, racing meets and for other legitimate purposes.''
Thus it will be seen that the fair association's power
to lease is expressly limited by statute in two particulars-(!) length and period of lease and (2) purposes
of the lease.
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The lease arrangement in question is in flagrant
violation of the first limitation. It is for a five year
period with an option for an additional five years. It
is for the full term of each year and is not confined to
"any portion of the interval between the holding of the
annual or biennial exhibition.'' Statutory authority of
public officers must ~e strictly construed. 46 C. J.,
Page 1032. This rule is particularly applicable where
public officers are granted the authority to alienate
state lands or property.
50 C. J., Page 1139;
Taylor v. Balderston (Ida.) 68 P. 2d. 761, 763;
Carpenter v. Okanogan County (Wash.) 299 P. 400.
In Panama-Pacific Inte.mational Exposition Company v. Panama Pacific International Expoilition Commissi.on (Cal.) 174 P. 890, the court held that where a
public commission is granted power over state property,
and the language of the grant contains terms which
qualify the power, the qualifications are to be construed
as conditions beyond which the grantee of the power
eannot go, insofar as such qualifications are favorable to
the state.
That the
the terms of
recognized by
v. State Road

authority of public officers is limited to
the statute conferring such authority is
this court in Oampbell Building Oompany
Cornmission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d. 857.

Our legislature has seen fit to limit the leasing
power of the fair association to certain intervals, and
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the lease agreements under consideration here violate
such limitation. The wi.sdom of such limitation is not
for us to decide, but rather for the legislature.
The lease agreements with Beehive Midways, Inc.
also violate the second limitation of 85-4-7, Utah Code
Annotated 1943, namely the purposes for which the state
property may be leased. Under the statute they may
lease the property for private stock exhibitions, shows
and racing meets. The specific purposes as set forth
are then followed by the words ''and for other legitimate purposes.'' The lease agreements under consideration certainly do not fall within any of the specific purposes set forth in the statute, and must be justified, if they can, as falling within the phrase ''and for
other legitimate purposes." It is the position of the
respondents that this last quoted phrase does not enlarge the authority to such an extent as to permit the
leasing of the association's property for the purposes
of amusement rides, games and shows. The doctrine of
ejusdem generis is based on the theory that if the legislature had intended general words to he used in an
unrestricted sense, it should have made no mention of
particular classes as was done in the instant case.
Bush Terminal Company, 93 Fed. 2d., 659, 660.
Where words of specific and limited significance in
a statute are followed by general words. of a more comprehensive import, the general words should be construed as embracing only such persons, places or things
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as are of like kind or class to those de signa ted by the
specific words.
Wiggins v. State, 172 Ind. 78, 84 N.E. 718;
Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 40, 26 N.E. 839.
In Hurtt·. Oak Downs, Inc. (Tex.) 85 S.W. 2d., 294,
298, the court stated that under the rule of ejusdem
generis, the particular words are presumed to describe
certain species, and the general words to be used for the
purpose of including other species of the same genus,
for the reason that, if the legislature had intended the
general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it
would have made no mention of particular classes. The
words 'other' or 'any other' following an enumeration
of particular classes, are therefore, to be read as 'other
such like' and to include only others of a like kind and
character.
It is hard, if not impossible, to conceive that amusement rides, games and shows can be 'other such like'
as private stock exhibitions, shows and racing meets.
Respondents cannot place too much emphasis upon
the provisions of 85-4-7, wherein is set forth the purposes of the Utah State Fair .Association. This statute
is unequivocal and definite as to what these purposes
are. It states that the purpose of the association shall
be, ''to promote in the State of Utah stock breeding,
agriculture, horticulture, mining, manufacturing and the
domestic sciences and arts." From these words it is
evident that the Utah State Fair .Association is a branch
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the state government, created to educate the people
regarding agriculture, stock breeding, horticulture, mining, manufacturing and the domestic sciences and arts.
It was not created to provide amusement for the people
of the State of Utah. In entering into the agreement
with Beehive Midways, Inc., the state fair association
is departing from its main objective, as set forth in the
statute, and is making its education purposes secondary
to the amusement business. Contrary to appellants'
statement on page thirty of their brief, the Utah State
Fair Association was created to promote the general
welfare of the people of the State of Utah.
It was stated in Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture (Ky.) 173 S.W. 1143, 1144 as follows:
'' . . . The purpose of the holding of a state
fair is to enlighten and educate all the people
of the state in regard to the more advanced methods of agriculture, forestry, growing of livestock,
and poultry, and to educate the people as to the
most profitable kind of liv.estock to be raised, and
the most suitable crops in which to till the soil,
and the most advanced methods of doing same.
It cannot be successfully contended that the enlightenment and education received by the people
at the exhibitions given by the state board of agriculture are any less valuable or the information
received ther.e any less worthy of being disseminated by the state government than the education
given in the public schools of the state.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In re: Rhea v. Newman (Ky.) 156 S.W. 154, 160,
the court made the following statement:

"The state fair is one of the great institutions of the state. It was created for the purpose of improving and educating the people of
the state along highly important lines and no one
will, or can, successfully contend that the state
fair is not one of the most important and essential adjuncts of the state government. In these
times of greatly increased population and the consequent increased demands for the products of the
soil, no other line of business activity conduces
as much to the public prosperity or improved
farming methods. In order to keep abreast of
the times our farmers must use the most improved methods, and the easiest way to induce
them to do this is by causing them to se,e and thus
become i~terested in what others are doing.''
The two foregoing cases clearly set forth the objects
and purposes of a state fair association. The same is
true of the Utah State Fair Association and is so recognized in the language of the statute itself. The Utah
State Fair Association was created for educational purposes, and as such, acts in a governmental capacity as an
arm of the state government. Both of the Kentucky cases
heretofore quoted from held that the state fair was a
government function.
'The fact that the Utah State Fair Board was created
for the purpose of improving a.nd educating the people of
this state in regard to more advanced methods of agriculture, growing of livestock, etc., is fundamental. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further fact that the Utah State Fair Board, by its past
operations, has strayed from this highly important purpose has been a subject of public concern. We hope we
may have the indulgence of the court in referring to an
article which appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune on
January 20, 1949, on page 26, which is as follows:
"FAIRS WANDER FROM GOALS, BUREAU
SAYS
''Charging that recent state fairs have strayed
from educational to entertainment affairs, fair
committe.e members of the Utah State Farm
Bureau federation Wednesday were preparing a
request that the fair be returned to its original
purpose.
''A committee headed by A. V. Smoot, Corinne,
Box Elder county, was named at an earlier meeting to prepare recommendations for preparation
to Gov. J. Bracken Lee on ways and means of
placing the state fair on an educational basis and
assuring agriculture its rightful position at the
fair.
"Others named to the committee were Lee
Thurgood, Clearfield, representing dairy breeders; Merrill Warnick, Pleasant Grove, Utah,
Dairy federation; J. A. Howell, Ogden, state
horticultural society, and Alvin Barton, Manti,
Sanpete county, livestock interests.''
Respondents concede that the Utah State Fair Association may, while holding a biennial exhibition or
annual exhibition, provide amusement rides, shows and
games for the purpose of attracting people to the state
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fair. However, the providing of these amus,ements,
shows and games is only incidental to the main objective, which is education. The Utah State Fair Association was not created to promote amusement or provide
profit to the State of Utah, which is certainly the result
of the agreement with Beehive Midways, Inc. It is
stated in 1 Cal. Jur., page 86, as follows:
'' . . . anything done by the state as to the
general conduct of the state fair must necessarily
relate to the general public welfare and cannot
be construed, in any just sense, as an act for the
promotion of business for a profit.''
Can it be said that providing the people of the State
of Utah with amusement shows and games for a profit
in any way relates to the general public welfare~ The ·
legislature specifically recognizes the propositjon that
the educational purposes of the state fair association
shall not be subserviant to any other purpose.
In Sec. 85-4-7, the legislature has enumerated the
purposes of the association and then specifically limited
the authority of the association to lease its property. It
limited the leasing of the property to periods during any
portion of the interval between the holding of the annual
and biennial exhibitions. If the legislature had desired
long term leases of the association property, it would
have not set forth this limitation.
Thus it will be seen that the authority of the Utah
State Fair Association to lease its property is limited to
private stock exhibitions, shows, racing meets and things
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of a similar genus, and then only for a term during any
portion ofthe interval between the holding of the annual
or biennial exhibitions. The agreements with Beehive
Midways, Inc. do not fall within the same genus as private stock exhibitions, shows and racing meets and certainly exceed the limitations in the statute relating to
the term of any lease.

I
I
I

I

II. THE STATE FAIR BOARD HAD AUTHORITY
TO ENTER INTO THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
Much of the argument contained under this topic has
been answered by respondents under the previous topic.
In this argument the appellants in their brief again rely
upon the proposition that the state fair association has
the power to sell, buy or exchange property and, therefore, must have the authority to lease its property. We
again invite the court's. attention to the agreements themselves, which are not in any sense a lease of the property, but are rather an exclusive franchise or license
granted to Beehive Midways, Inc. We would like also
to point out again that the state fair association's authority to sell, buy or exchange property relates only to that
property acquired since the original grant.
While it might be conceded that often times the
power to sell includes the power to lease, we do not
think this rule applicable in the instant case inasmuch
as the statutes of the State of Utah (85-4-7) expressly
limit the power of the state fair association in leasing
its property.
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Furthermore, while it may be true that under certain circumstanc-es a city or similar entity may determine
that its property devoted to a public use is not needed for
such use either for a limited time or as part of its acreage
and, therefore, can make leases accordingly, this rule is
not applicable to the instant case, inasmuch as there is
no showing that the property of the state fair association is not needed for a public use. Also, as has been
stressed before, the agreements under consideration do
not amount to the leasing of a certain portion of the
state fair lands, but rather grant to Beehive Midways,
Inc. the exclusive right to operate at any time of the year,
amusement rides, games and shows on any and all parts
of the state fair lands.
Respondents are of the opinion that the agreement
under consideration violates the spirit of Article VI, Section 26, Subdivision 16, of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, which prohibits the legislature from granting to
an individual, association or corporation any privilege,
immunity or franchise. The agreements under consideration grant to Beehive Midways, Inc. ''the exclusive right
to operate and license others to opera;te all amusement
rides, games and shows upon the Utah state fair
grounds'' for a period of five years. This is certainly in
the nature of a special franchise or privilege which the
legislature of the State of Utah would be prohibited from
granting. If the Utah State Legislature could not grant
such a right, it is hard to understand how the Utah State
Fair Association, which is an arm of the government,
could do so.
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III.

STATE OFFICERS MAY ENTER INTO CONTRACTS SUCH AS THE LEASE AGREEMENT
HERE INVOLVED EXTENDING BEYOND
'THEIR TERM OF OFFICE.

IV.

THE PRES~NT STATE FAIR BOARD MAY
BIND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN A LEASE CONTRACT SUCH AS THAT HERE INVOLVED.

For convenience, respondents will argue the above
two topics together inasmuch as they relate to the same
subject matter.
'The general rule of law relating to contracts extending beyond the term of public officers is stated in
43 Am. Jur., Page 101, as follows:
''The power of public officers to enter into
contracts which extend beyond the terms of their
offices depends primarily upon the extent of their
authority under the law. A distinction has been
drawn between two classes of powers,- governmental or legislative and proprietary or business. In the exercise of the governmental or legislative powers, a board, in the absence of statutory provision, cannot make a contract extending
beyond its own term. But in the exercise of business or proprietary powers, a board may contract
as any individual, unless restrained by statutory
provision to the contrary. Obviously, contracts
extending beyond the terms of the officers executing them will be held invalid where the making
of the contracts tends to limit or diminish the efficiency of those who will succeed the incumbents
in office or usurps power which was clearly intended to be given to the successors."
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The lease and supplemental agreement under consideration extends beyond the term of office of the members of the Utah State Fair Board (See Exhibit E),
and certainly would limit and diminish the effeciency
of their successors in the performance of their duties. If
the lease and supplemental agreement should be ~eld to
be valid, then the succe·ssors of the present members of
the Utah State Fair Board would be bound by their
terms and conditions regardless of the necessity of any
change of policy, plans or conditions.
As to whether the State Fair Board acts in a governmental or proprietary capacity in leasing the association's property, reference can be made to those cases
wherein state fair boards have been sued in tort. In tort
actions the general rule is that a governmental agency
cannot be held liable if it is acting in a governmental
capacity. It has been generally held that state fair
boards in conducting state fairs exercise a governmental
function. See 52 A. L. R. 1405, 1407. In the case of Zoelle.r
v. State Board of Agriculture (Supra), it was held that
the Kentucky State Board of Agriculture was an agency
of the state and could not be held liable in tort inasmuch
as it was acting in a governmental rather than in a
private capacity. The Kentucky State Board of Agriculture was a state corporation having the right to sue and
be sued. It was not a corporation for a pecuniary profit
and was empowered to conduct state fairs. All profits,
if any, derived from the conduct of the state fairs were to
be paid into the State Treasury. The Kentucky State
Board of Agriculture was, in relation to state fairs, in
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a similar position to the Utah State Fair Association. The
Utah State Fair Association is a governmental agency
not formed for a pecuniary profit; it has the right to sue
and be sued and is empowered to conduct stat-e fairs.
Thus, using the case of Zoeller v. Bo1ard of Agricultur'e as an analogy, the Utah State Fair Association
could not be held liable in tort in the exercise of any of
its functions inasmuch as such functions are governmental and it could not enter into a contract beyond the
terms of the officers for the same reason.
Moore v. Lucern County, 262 Pa. 216, 105
Atl. 94; Weir v. Day, et al, 35 Ohio St. Ap. 143.
In Stowe v. Hartford ~air Grounds Assoc~at~on, et
al, 249 Mich. 107, 227 N. W. 702, a twenty-five yearlease
from the defendant Hartford Fair Grounds Association,
a profit corporation, was executed to the defendant, Van
Buren County Agricultural and Horticultural Society,
a non-profit corporation, at a nominal rental of $1.00 per
year. In the course of the opinion the court states:
"The circuit court judge held that the lease
for twenty-five years was void. There was no
necessity for giving a lease for this length of
time under the conditions as hereinbefore set
forth. It amounted practically to a sale of the
assets and without any action by the stockholders * * * .
''The evidence in this case shows that the
consideration in the least was adequate and proper. However, it might develop during the balance of the term of the corporate franchise or a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
renewal thereof that the agricultural society or
some other responsible lessee might be able to
run a fair at a profit without any subsidies and
exempt from taxation. In that event if a more
profitable offer for a lease could he secured the
fair association should not be in a position where
it would forever be precluded from accepting such
offer. The judge was correct in holding that the.
lease for twenty-five years was void."
Appellants argue that the agreements under consideration were entered into by the state fair association
as an exercise of its proprietary functions rather than
as an exercise of its governmental functions. With this, of
course, the respondents violently disagree. As has previously been pointed out, the fair association is an arm
of the government, designed for the purpose of educating
the people and, therefore, a governmental function. It
was not created for the purpose of providing the state
with revenue or profit. In this connection appellants, on
page thirty-seven of their brief, admit that the agreements were executed solely for the purpose of raising
revenue. This being true, it is certainly outside the scope
of the purposes and objectives of the Utah State Fair
Association. Appellants feel that all discussion and argument by appellants relating to the Centennial celebration and the Utah Centennial Commission is immaterial
and irrelevant. The Utah Centennial Commission was
never a party to the agreement.
To the matter in question it is immaterial a;s to the
status of the stockholders of Beehive Midways, Inc. pertaining to recovering back any money which they have
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expended. They expended money in an attempt to make
a profit solely for their own benefit. Whether they make
a profit or not is immaterial in this proceedings.
The agreements under consideration would certainly
limit and circumvent successors in office as to their control of future state fairs. If the successors to the present
members of the Utah State Fair Association are bound
by the terms of these agreements, they would not in the
future be able to provide what they might think is the
proper form or type of amusement which would be most
likely to attract the general public to the state fairs.
V.

THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS FAIR ASSOCIATION IS ESTOPPED FRO::'.[ QUESTIONING
THE VALIDITY OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT,
AND TI-IE RESPONDENTS l\IAY NOT vVAIVE
SUCH ESTOPPEL.

Respondents find it ra:ther difficult to discuss the
proposition set forth in this topic inasmuch as the same
is certainly unique. As we follow the argument of the
appellants, it is to the effect that the State of Utah cannot question the validity of the agreements because the
stockholders of Beehive Midways, Inc. have expended
considerable money. Therefore, the State of Utah would
he estopped from questioning the validity of the agreements, and this being true, the respondents and the general public are also estopped. We are unable to follow
this line of reasoning. Certainly the respondents have
done nothing which could be construed as creating an
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estoppel which might exist in favor of Beehive Midways,
Inc. as against the State of Utah.
If the fair association, in the first instant, did not
have the requisite authority to enter into the agreement,
then nothing that either the fair association or Beehive
Midways, Inc. did thereafter could validate the agreement. The sole question is, did the fair association, 11nder
the Utah statutes, have the authority to enter into the
agreements 1 Respondents contend that the answer is
definitely in the negative.
As was held in Campbell Bui~ing Compamy v. State
Road Commission, (Supra) the authority of public officers is limited to the terms of the statute conferring
such authority, and any person doing business with the
state by way of contract or otherwise, must take notice
of the limitations on the authority of the officers or
agents of the state.
Furthermore, the issue of estoppel was not raised in
the pleadings, and it is a settled rule of law in this jurisdiction that a party, in order to avail itself of the de ..
fense of estoppel, must plead the same.
Campbell v. Nunn (Utah) 2 P. 2d 899; Barber v. Anderson (Utah) 274 P. 136.
Respondents also doubt that the question of estoppel,
even though properly pleaded, could be raised in this
type of action. The action is for a declaratory judgment
wherein the court is asked to make an interpretation of
a contract and declare it either valid or void. It would
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seem that any qt
until such time aL
denied or upheld.

VI.

)n of estoppel would be premature
LIH:

validity of the contract had been

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PETITION OF CENTENNIAL COM~1ISSION
LEAVE TO INTERVENE IN THE CAUSE.

As has been previously pointed out in this brief, the
Centennial Commission was not a party to the lease
agreements. It, together with various other state agencies, including the attorney general's office, approved
the supplemental agreement, but was not bound as a
party to this agreement. Furthermore, the Centennial
Commission, by statute, terminates on July 24, 1949,
and the lease agreements, according to their terms, are
to remain in effect until 1951, with an option for an additional five years.
The Centennial Commission filed with the lower
court a petition for leave to intervene, together with a
proposed complaint. The trial court, taking into consideration the fact that the Centennial Commission was not
a party to the agreements, and the fact that it would go
out of existence on July 24, 1949, denied the petition to
intervene. The appellants did not join with the Centennial Commission in petitioning for intervention and are,
therefore, not a proper party to raise this issue upon appeal. If it could be considered that the trial court erred
in denying the Centennial Commission's petition to interSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
vene, then such error could only be .
•·
tennial Commission itself.

~aled

,-

by the Cen-

~\'I-·

Appellants filed with the lower court a supplemental
answer (Tr. 39-47), wherein the powers and duties of the
Centennial Commission were set forth, and the court
was requested to direct the plaintiffs to make the Centennial Commission a party to the proceeding. The trial
court denied this prayer, again taking into consideration
the fact that the Centennial Commission was not a party
to the contract, and further, that the Centennial Commission would be out of existence during the greater
portion of the life of the agreement.
The interest which the Centennial Commission had
in this action was no greater than that of any private
citizen of the State of Utah or any other state agency.
In fact it was less in view of the fact that the commission was to he terminated on July 24, 1949. Respondents
contend that the trial court did not abuse its di'Scretion in
refusing appellants' request to make the Centennial Commission a party to the action. The rule relating to necessary parties in an action for declaratory relief is stated
in 16 Am. J ur., Page 330, as follows:
''The general rule that all persons interested
in the controversy must be parties to an action
for declaratory relief requires that, ordinarily,
all interested persons who are not plaintiffs be
made defendants. The rule is not, however, mandatory in every case and does not preclude the
exercise of the discretion of a court of equity as
to who are necessary parties, especially where
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the statute involved provides, as does the uniform
act, that no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties.''
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, respondents submit tha·t the decision of
the trial court, holding the lease agreemen t:s between the
Utah State Fair As·sociation and Beehive Midways, Inc.,
invalid, should be sustained for the following reasons as
argued in this brief:
1. The lease agreements exceed the limitations of
the fair association's leasing power as set forth and defined in 85-4-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, in that said
agreements are for a longer period of time than that permitted under the statute, and that they are for a purpose
not permitted for under the statute.
2. The lease agreements are void for the reason
that they are for a period of time in excess of the terms
of office of the members of the Utah State Fair Board.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS H. CALLISTER
BEVERLY S. CLENDENIN
JAMESINGEBRETSEN
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